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Abstract: High courts typically struggle to find the right balance between its error 
correction function and its final interpretation of constitutional clauses. The more 
time and resources spent in error correction limits the greater is the ability to offer 
improvements in constitutional interpretation. Some courts seek to streamline the 
appeals’ process by dismissing appeals which have not complied with certain 
formal requirements. Our study contributes to the growing comparative literature 
on High Court docket management by investigating the time to case disposition of 
appeals with formal errors in the Argentine Supreme Court. We show that this 
type of appeals’ dismissal has not resulted in efficient case duration or in an 
increase of CSJN’s output. Furthermore, the multivariate analysis shows that 
several case characteristics, such as the appeals’ subject matter or the type of 
formal error, affect appeal duration. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Courts are usually organized in a hierarchical way. Superior courts are generally 
charged with the review of decisions made by lower courts which were appealed 
by parties to the case. As a result, it is believed that error correction is one of the 
primary roles of appellate courts (Kornhauser 1995; Shavell 1995). Other roles 
include ensuring uniformity in the application of the law, and even law creation 
(Posner, 1985).  
In the case of Supreme Courts, providing the ultimate interpretation of 
the country’s constitution appears to be one of the most important functions. 
Nevertheless, High Courts typically struggle to find the right balance between its 
error correction function and its final interpretation of constitutional clauses. The 
more time and resources spent in error correction limits the ability to offer 
improvements in constitutional interpretation
1
 In this context, Supreme Courts 
need to make difficult decisions in terms of the way in which they ought to 
manage their limited resources, both in terms of times and personnel.  
The ability to deny certiorari is perhaps the main docket management 
weapon typically found in a Supreme Court’s arsenal to allow them to achieve 
their desired balance. When such a possibility is at the High Courts’ disposal, the 
use of a pre-established formula both facilitates the prompt dismissal of the cases 
the Courts deem not to merit review and the allocation of more time and resources 
to the study of the remaining cases.  
Moreover, some courts go even further in seeking to streamline the 
process of appeals and improve the efficiency of their handling. For example the 
Supreme Court of Taiwan and the Argentine Supreme Court have the ability to 
dismiss appeals which have not complied with certain formal requirements 
(Eisenberg & Huang, 2012; Muro et al., 2016). Our study contributes to the 
growing literature of comparative Supreme Courts by investigating a subset of the 
discretionary docket of the Supreme Court of Argentina (hereinafter, CSJN), 
                                                     
1
 Two prominent examples can be cited on this balancing effort. Brazil incorporated 
provisions to generate binding precedents (Súmula Vinculante) and docket control techniques 
similar to the writ of certiorari (Requisito da Repercussāo Geral) after the Brazilian Supreme 
Court received more than 160,000 appeals during 2002. See Maria A. Oliveira & Nuno Garoupa, 
Stare Decisis and Certiroari Arrive to Brazil: A Comparative Law and Economics Approach, 26 
Emory Int'l L. Rev. 555 (2012). In India the Supreme Court received over 80,000 thousand appeals 
in 2014. Nevertheless, in a recent decision on the Constitutional Bench matter of Mathai @ Joby 
v. George & Anr SLP (C) No. 7105 of 2010, the Court refused to establish guidelines that would 
help in dismissing appeals. See Rishad Chowdhury, The Indian Supreme Court Declines to Revisit 
its Docket Crisis: The Most Important Recent Order That You’ve Never Heard of, Int’l Const. L. 
Blog, Jan. 27, 2016, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/01/the-indian-supreme-court-declines-
to-revisit-its-docket-crisis-the-most-important-recent-order-that-youve-never-heard-of/   
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namely, those appeals dismissed because of formal errors. It provides significant 
insights as to what the underlying aims of  Acordada 4/2007 ultimately were, and 
the extent to which the Court achieved them. 
Against what may have been envisaged, we show that the incorporation 
of the new formal dismissal grounds by Acordada 4/2007 has not been sufficient 
to obtain efficient case duration nor to increase the CSJN’s output. While on 
average it takes almost 320 days for an appeal to be dismissed, our multivariate 
analysis shows that several aspects affect appeal duration. For instance, Labor 
Law appeals need on average about 100 more days to be resolved. Similarly, the 
type of error found, namely violations related to the maximum number of pages or 
the maximum number of lines per page, can be associated to more delays. The 
duration of these types of appeal dismissals’ likely affect time to case disposition 
of other type of appeals and could help explain the lack of output increase.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II will introduce relevant 
background information on CSJN. Section III presents our main hypotheses. 
Section IV describes our data collection. Sections V and VI present, respectively, 
descriptive statistics and our main results. Section VII discusses our main results.  
II. LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
CSJN has been the head of the Argentine judiciary since its creation in 1863.
2
 
Yet, after the 2001 economic crisis, CSJN and the judiciary in general were at the 
center of the legitimacy crisis that affected public offices more broadly but that 
had also led to CSJN’s “worst crisis of credibility in its institutional history”.3 
CSJN was significantly renovated by the first Kirchner administration (2003-7). 
Since then, the new Court struggled to re-legitimize itself. Among its actions 
directed towards this goal, CSJN has sought to improve the efficiency and 
transparency of its decision-making. In 2007, the Court adopted Acordada 4/2007 
(from now on Acordada) as one of its key measures to streamline and facilitate 
appeals before it, as well as making decision-making more transparent and 
efficient. 
Before introducing the basic tenets of Acordada, it is necessary to 
succinctly explain some basic facts about the jurisdiction of the Argentine 
Supreme Court. CSJN intervenes both through its originary jurisdiction and as the 
tribunal of last resort.
4
 Its originary jurisdiction is used for cases related to foreign 
ambassadors, ministers or consuls, or cases between provinces or a province and a 
                                                     
2
 The Argentine constitution’s basic framework for federal jurisdiction closely follows 
article III, section 2 of the US constitution. Garay (1991). 
3
 Ruibal(2009). 
4
 When the Argentine parliament established the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, it 
followed closely the U.S. Judiciary Act of 1789.  
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foreign state.
5
 The Court’s appellate jurisdiction6 includes appeals of cases 
decided by federal or national courts,
7
 as well as appeals from provincial supreme 
courts.
8
 The standard appellate jurisdiction is known as Extraordinary Appeal 
(Recurso Extraordinario Federal; hereinafter, REX) and it has three different 
sources. A first possibility arises when a case questions the validity of a treaty, 
federal law or action undertaken under color of federal authority and the local 
court holds against the validity of the treaty, law or the federal authority. A 
second alternative arises when the validity of a provincial law, decree or act has 
been questioned as unconstitutional or contrary to a treaty or federal law, and the 
provincial court decides in favor of the validity of the provincial measure. Finally, 
the Supreme Court may intervene when a party invokes a constitutional clause, a 
treaty, a law, or a grant of federal authority and the provincial court decides 
against the norm or privilege invoked.
9
 There is a separate kind of appellate 
jurisdiction known as ordinary appeals, which are reserved for cases in which the 
State is a party and the amount of the claim exceeds a certain figure.
10
 This form 
of appellate jurisdiction is subjected to different rules and it is not addressed in 
this study. CSJN vindicated quite early its authority to perform constitutional 
review, despite the absence of an explicit constitutional clause providing such 
authority.
11
 Constitutional adjudication also followed the American model of a 
decentralized and concrete review. Unlike its American counterpart, however, 
Argentina lacks a formal doctrine of stare decisis. 
In order to reach CSJN, the appellant needs to file a complaint –a REX- 
in the relevant lower court, which decides whether the appeal meets the 
                                                     
5
 Argentine Constitution, Art. 117 and art. 1 of Act 48 (Organización y Competencia de los 
Tribunales Nacionales). 
6
 In most of these cases, the Supreme Court possess appellate jurisdiction, save for those 
cases concerning foreign ambassadors, ministers and consuls, and in those in which a province 
shall be a party, where the Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction. See article 117 of the 
Argentine Constitution. An unofficial English version of the constitution is available at 
http://www.senado.gov.ar/web/interes/constitucion/english.php. See, accordingly, article 1 of Law 
N° 48, available in Spanish at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/115000-
119999/116296/texact.htm 
7
 Article 4 of Law N° 48, available in Spanish at 
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/115000-119999/116296/texact.htm. 
8
 Miller (manuscript on file with the authors, 133). 
9
 Article 14 of Law N° 48, available in Spanish at 
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/115000-119999/116296/texact.htm 
10
 Ordinary appeals before the Supreme Court have become more and more common due to 
the fact that the figure required to have access to the Court was established during the 1990s and 
has not been updated in accordance with inflation. (Anonymous interviewee) 
11
 Sojo, Eduardo c/ Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, 32 Fallos 120 (1887); Miller 
(unpublished manuscript). The 1994 Constitution, though, provides the Court with this authority 
explicitly (art. 43, para. 1). 
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substantive and procedural requirements. If the lower court determines that all 
requirements are satisfied, the appeal is sent to CSJN. If the lower court believes 
they are not, the appeal is denied. In that case litigants may ask CSJN to hear the 
case through a Recurso de Queja (hereinafter RHE). CSJN in this case will review 
whether the lower court legitimately denied the appeal. Interestingly for our 
purposes, this two-fold way of reaching the Court has a concrete impact on the 
way in which the appeal is examined. Once appeals reach CSJN, they are all 
received and distributed by the same office (Mesa de Entradas). Each appeal is 
distributed to the Judicial Department (hereinafter, JD) specialized in the area of 
the appeal. This JD will conduct a preliminary assessment on the basis of the 
formal requirements. The specialized JD will often keep the file for internal 
drafting before being circulated among the justices if the appeal arrives through 
RHE. When the Appeal was granted by the previous Court, the specialized JD 
will usually distribute it among the justices, often starting by one with particular 
specialization in an area (to start circulation among them).
12
 
The fact that CSJN has jurisdiction over a case does not guarantee that 
the court will arrive at a decision on the merits of the appeal. In 1990 Congress 
passed a reform of the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure, which gave the 
Court discretion to dispose of appeals based on a lack of relevance.
13
 Since then, 
CSJN has routinely made use of the discretionary power to reject appeals on the 
grounds of insufficient lower court error or when the matters raised are either 
insignificant or inconsequential. In 2007, CSJN introduced Acordada as a formal 
step before proceeding to analyze any extraordinary appeal. Once an 
extraordinary appeal is dismissed by CSJN –on any grounds- it cannot be raised 
again. 
Acordada stipulates a series of formal requirements each appeal must 
follow, among which we highlight the following ones. Acordada stipulates a 
maximum length of 40 pages for the original appeal –REX- (art. 1), and of 10 
pages for the direct appeal –RHE (art.4). Further, each page should have a 
maximum of 26 lines, and a minimum font of 12 (art. 1).
14
 The appeal (both REX 
and RHE) should have a cover page with all the relevant information (arts. 2 and 
5, respectively). The submission itself should contain specific references about the 
court whose decision is appealed, the facts of the case, the type of harm the 
decision generates for the appellant, a clear refutation of “each and every 
                                                     
12
 Tax Law appeals are always analyzed by the relevant JD (Secretaría Judicial no. 7). 
Interview A-3. 
13
 Arts 280 and 285, Código de Procedimiento Civil y Comercial de la Nación, Ley 23.774 
(1990), available in Spanish at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/15000-
19999/16547/texact.htm#5. 
14
 An ammendment has established that Appeals should be presented in A4 type of paper.  
Acordada 38/2011.  
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independent argument” on which the attacked decision rests, and a “direct and 
clear relationship” between the federal norms invoked and the decision that has 
been reached (arts. 3 and 6, respectively). The RHE submission should be 
accompanied by copies of several parts of the file (art. 7). Finally, article 11 
stipulates that failure to fulfill each and every requirement would be sanctioned by 
rejection of the Appeal, unless CSJN considers that that lack of fulfillment is not 
an insurmountable obstacle for the admissibility of the Appeal (first para, in fine). 
Article 12 clarifies that these provisions will not apply to appeals presented in 
forma pauperis.
15
 In order for CSJN to use Acordada to reject a submission, it 
must deliver an opinion –typically of the boilerplate type-.16 In practical terms, it 
means that, at the time of our study, at least four justices had to vote deciding that 
the submission had not met the minimal standards set forth by Acordada.
17
 
Notably, this procedure is exactly the same one the Supreme Court employs in 
issuing opinions on the merits of cases.  
III. HYPOTHESES 
As this is the first study to test case duration in CSJN we had little in the way of 
ex ante beliefs. In addition, prior to this study the characteristics of appeals 
rejected on the basis of Acordada were largely unknown. Thus, a substantial part 
of the results we report are descriptive to enable assessment of our principal 
hypotheses. In this Section we present our main hypotheses. 
In order to develop our initial hypotheses we start by explaining the 
objective nature of formal errors in the appeals process under Acordada. Each 
type of error consists of an easily determinable violation of the rules set forth in 
Acordada such as relevant number of pages, or of lines per page, or the 
attachment to the Appeal of specific copies of the original file. As a result, we 
would expect similar case duration regardless of the specific article (or articles) of 
Acordada which was found not to be complied with.  
Case characteristics may also affect case duration. Appellants typically 
argue that the previous decision was arbitrary, that it created a federal affront,
18
 or 
                                                     
15
 Acordada contains a model of the cover that both the initial appeal and the “queja” 
should follow. 
16
 Boilerplate opinions are also used to dismiss appeals on discretionary grounds and on 
lack of autonomous reasoning grounds. 
17
 In 2014, CSJN composition was reduced to 5 Justices. Hence, at least 3 Justices have to 
vote now. It should also be noted that a majority vote is reached for dismissal even if a vote 
provides other grounds for appeal dismissal in a separate opinion. 
18
  This includes the appeal possibilities described in section 2 above under article 14 of 
Law N° 48. 
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both.
19
 Argentine scholars frequently contend that CSJN’s true role should not 
focus on error correction but on issuing opinions on federal affront cases.
20
 If this 
is really the case, we would expect case duration to be longer in federal affront 
cases as CSJN may spend a more time deciding whether to use Article 11’s 
exception to decide the case on its substance.  
Thirdly, the underlying structure of CSJN may play a role too. Before 
Justices analyze and vote on a case, a thematic JD prepares internal memos.
21
 If 
any of those JDs has a higher than average workload, we would expect that the 
cases they handle take more time.  
Finally, we would expect case duration to be affected by the level of 
agreement among Justices. CSJN Justices routinely abstain from voting once a 
majority is reached,
22
 essentially concealing their attitudes towards those appeals. 
In some instances though, one or more Justices issue a separate opinion 
supporting the majority, or issues a partial or total dissent. When any of this 
happens we would expect the case duration to be longer because more Court time 
would be spent on average in drafting the opinion.  
IV. DATA COLLECTION AND PROCESSING 
The focus of this study is on rejections of CSJN appeals’ based on formal errors. 
CSJN publishes online every opinion it issues, along with information on case 
history and other background information, including the date of CSJN appeal 
filing. Starting in 2012, CSJN’s Jurisprudence office categorized every opinion 
according to different criteria and it also introduced a search engine which allows 
looking for opinions meeting any of the pre-determined criteria. One such 
criterion is the outcome of the opinion. We used the search engine to find every 
opinion that the CSJN made based on Acordada during 2012, excluding pension 
                                                     
19
 Another possibility is that the appellant invokes grave institutional consequences of the 
lower court opinion. These are quite rare.   
20
 Interview A-5; A-9; A-15; A-1. 
21
 See Section II above.  
22
 Interview A-3. 
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cases.
23
 That search generated 1,162 opinions. Lack of sufficient information 
made us discard 22 observations, leaving a working database of 1,140 opinions.
24
  
The census data provides a sound basis for assessing case duration and 
party capability theory. Further, the opinions we look at are significant. CSJN 
reports of the 8,812 cases decided during 2012 (excluding pension decisions). 
Therefore, the opinions we looked at represent a staggering 13 percent of the total 
number of cases produced by the CSJN in that period.
25
 The practical importance 
of these opinions to every participant in the CSJN appeals process is evident.
26
 
The cases identified by the methods described above were coded by 
student research assistants. Prior to the student coding, the authors developed a 
template to structure the coding and a coding protocol. After review of the 
performance of the form, the protocol and the students in an initial set of cases, 
the form and the protocol were revised. The students used that revised form and 
protocol to code the cases, under the supervision of the authors. 
To further understand CSJN work on Acordada, we conducted a series of 
interviews with key participants of the appeal’s process. After developing an open 
ended questionnaire, we interviewed practicing lawyers with regular experience 
filing CSJN appeals. We interviewed Appeal Courts judges and Appeal Courts 
officials who routinely handle CSJN appeals. In addition, we interviewed CSJN 
Officials in charge of dealing with appeals and preparing internal documents. 
Finally, we interviewed officials from the relevant public offices in charge of 
litigation before CSJN, ie, the Procuración General de la Nación, the Defensoría 
                                                     
23
 Pension cases are somewhat particular and therefore we decided to exclude them from 
the analysis. Specifically, almost every pension case arises out of disputes between pensioners and 
the government due to lack of adjustments made to the pension amount over the years. Typically, 
lower courts would order the government to adjust those amounts according to a specific criterion 
and the government has adopted a policy which mandates its legal department to appeal each case 
up to the Supreme Court. Therefore, there are thousands of similar cases reaching the Supreme 
Court each year which don’t merit much attention.  
24
 Since the CSJN website contains all of the cases decided by the CSJN, the resulting 
database provides a complete picture of CSJN decisional activity on Acordada in the covered 
period. We tested the comprehensiveness of the database by comparing it with data obtained from 
the CSJN's secretariat. This comparison suggested that the data obtained from the CSJN website is 
indeed comprehensive, covering the full gamut of cases rejected based on Acordada. To the best 
of our knowledge, we assembled the first database to study CSJN appeals’ rejections based on 
formal errors. We were no able, however to revise the whole universe of CSJN decisions in 2012 
to look for possible incorrect categorizations. Nonetheless, the elevated levels of sophistication 
shown by the CSJN and its officials strongly suggests a high level of accuracy. 
25
 Descriptive statistics for the year 2012 provided by the CSJN, available at 
http://www.pjn.gov.ar/07_estadisticas/Libros/Estadi_12/Corte_12.htm 
26
 For instance, the prospect of appeal dismissals on formal error grounds affects the 
probability of private settlements. 
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General de la Nación, as well as the Procuración General del Tesoro de la 
Nación. After obtaining the first statistical results, we conducted a second round 
of interviews to better understand them. The answers obtained informed both our 
hypothesis design and the discussion section of this paper. A full list of 
interviewees who authorized us to reveal their names can be found in the Annex 
to this paper. To ensure greater disclosure, no proposition is explicitly attributed 
to any of them. 
V. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
During 2012 CSJN handed a total of 8,812 cases decisions on its discretionary 
jurisdiction, excluding pension cases.
27
 Those cases where handled through 5024 
decisions.
28
 Similar to other High Courts, most of the decisions came in the form 
of appeals’ dismissals. Among those dismissals, five main categories comprise 
almost the entire population (96 percent). The largest category of appeal dismissal 
is the Argentine equivalent to certiorari denied (49 percent, hereinafter Article 
280), followed by Acordada dismissals (28 percent) and dismissals based on lack 
of autonomous argumentation (10 percent).
29
 Furthermore, Acordada decisions 
are also the second largest category of CSJN opinions. As a result, Acordada case 
duration would have a direct impact on CSJN activity.  
To capture case duration, we coded both the date of CSJN appeal filing 
and the opinion date. As these are somewhat mechanical cases, we expected the 
CSJN to resolve them in a rapid manner. The results, however, show the process 
to be fairly time consuming. The average case duration is just shy of a year (318 
days, with a median of 299 days), while in the most delayed instances time to 
decision hovers over 3 years.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
27
 All figures in this paragraph do not include pension law decisions. The exclusion of 
pension law decisions follows from the original aim of the database collected and the fact that 
pension law cases -consisted mostly of amount readjustments- were systematically litigated to 
CSJN even though the law on the subject was settled. This exclusion does not affect the results 
obtained.    
28
 It is not uncommon for CSJN to decide more than one case in one opinion when there is 
a common factual and legal background.  
29
 The other two main categories are lack of definitive lower court opinion (6%) and lack of 
fee payment (3%).  
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FIGURE 1 
DISTRIBUTION OF CASE DURATION UNDER ACORDADA 
 
The measures of center do not change much if we divide the sample into 
criminal and civil cases.
30
 The median duration of criminal cases (292 days) is 
just a bit shorter than that of civil cases (303 days), but the spread is much larger 
in the later ones. The standard deviation for the criminal cases sample is quite 
large (117 days) but the one for civil cases almost doubles it (205 days). 
Accordingly, 25 percent of civil cases required well over a year to be resolved 
(425 days or more), while 5 percent of those cases lasted at least 740 days.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
30
 Under this classification, any non-criminal case is coded as a civil case. 
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FIGURE 2 
DISTRIBUTION OF CASE DURATION UNDER ACORDADA, DIVIDED BY CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL CASES 
 
One of the early criticisms that CSJN received after passing Acordada 
was that using it could jeopardize the benefits derived from CSJN’s “teaching 
role.”31 Article 11 of Acordada mandates that CSJN should reject the appeal by 
“merely mentioning the norm”, ie Acordada. Therefore, it was feared that the use 
Acordada would lead CSJN to avoid mentioning the specific legal basis of its 
opinion. That concern is not supported by the evidence. By contrast, the Court 
seems to have been quite explicit about the specific norms of Acordada that was 
not complied with by the relevant Appeal. For each case in our database we 
coded, the article (s) cited by CSJN. Most of the time (73 percent of cases) CSJN 
cites just one article and, in our sample, up to 5 articles are cited, but only 3 times. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
31
 Sacristán (2009). 
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FIGURE 3 
NUMBER OF ARTICLES CITED PER OPINION 
 
The article most frequently cited by CSJN is Article 4 (53 percent of the 
time), followed by Article 7 (41 percent) and Article 1 (24 percent). Articles 1 and 
4 refer to the maximum page extension and to the page format for the REX and 
RHE respectively. Together, the violation of the maximun length and page format 
accounts for 71 percent of all the appeals rejected. Adding Article 7 rejections –
i.e. appeals lacking copies of relevant dockett documents- accounts for 95 percent 
percent of all appeal rejections based on Acordada.  
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FIGURE 4 
FREQUENCY OF ARTICLES CITED BY CSJN 
 
The frequency of articles cited by the CSJN varies greatly between civil 
and criminal cases. In civil cases the predominant error cited is from Article 4 (54 
percent of the time), while in criminal cases Article 7 is cited in 71 percent of the 
cases. 
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FIGURE 5 
FREQUENCY OF CITED ARTICLES, DIVIDED BY CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 
 
The frequency of decisions based on Acordada varied greatly depending 
on the substance of the case. Figure 6 reports the frequency of decisions according 
to our categorization of the underlying subject matter. The area of law with the 
largest number of cases rejected due to formal errors was Labor Law (39 percent 
of all cases), while Insurance Law was the area of law with the least amount of 
formal rejections (0.4 percent).  
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FIGURE 6 
CASE SUBJECT AREA AND JURISDICTIONAL ORIGIN 
 
Voting distribution varied greatly across Justices. Justices exposure to 
appeals depend to a large extent on an internal circulation order which differs 
according to subject matter specialization.
32
 CSJN’s Justices routinely don’t vote 
once a majority is obtained. According to interviewee A-3, at the time of our 
study there was an internal rule approved by the Justices which directed case 
circulation to stop once 4 votes were reached if the case merited a boiler plate 
solution (for instance, certiorari denied). Table 1 shows voting frequency by 
individual Justice and subject area. Four Justices -Highton, Lorenzetti, Maqueda 
and Petracchi-, seem to have shouldered most of the burden of Acordada 
decisions.
33
 Each of these justices issued a concurring vote in at least 92 percent 
of the cases despite the great variation in subject area (with Justice Petracchi 
concurring in 98 percent of cases). At the other extreme, Justices Zaffaroni and 
Fayt issued concurring opinions in only 3 and 4 percent of cases respectively.  
 
                                                     
32
 There are two exceptions to the circulation order by subject area. Justices Maqueda and 
Petracchi opted out of this circulation scheme and review each appeal, regardless of its subject 
matter. 
33
 This information, of course, doesn’t speak to the total amount of opinions issued by each 
Justice. It is quite possible that the Justices who voted less in Acordada opinions voted more in 
other type of opinions.   
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TABLE 1 
FREQUENCY OF VOTING BY INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN EACH SUBJECT AREA 
Subject Area Argibay Fayt Highton Lorenzetti Maqueda Petracchi Zaffaroni 
# of 
cases 
per 
Area 
Bankruptcy 
Law 
0 1 38 37 34 38 0 38 
Labor Law 37 5 433 435 436 440 8 443 
Property Law 9 5 56 60 54 59 0 60 
Public law 139 11 163 178 176 187 3 193 
Tax Law 26 4 32 36 40 44 1 44 
Tort Law 24 4 115 110 108 110 2 115 
Constitutional 
Law 
0 0 4 5 5 5 1 5 
Contract Law 9 2 37 39 39 42 0 42 
Criminal law 78 7 95 76 99 113 16 115 
Criminal 
Procedure 
37 5 40 38 45 50 6 52 
Family Law 1 1 14 15 15 16 0 16 
Human 
Rights Law 
2 1 5 4 5 4 1 5 
Insurance 
Law 
0 0 4 4 4 4 0 4 
N/C 1 0 7 7 7 7 0 7 
Total 
concurring 
opinions 
363 46 1,043 1,044 1,067 1,119 38  
Total 
opinions 
370 46 1075 1049 1114 1121 115 1139 
 
VI. RESULTS 
A. Case duration analysis 
1. Type and number of errors cited  
As explained above, a main focus of this paper is to analyze the effects different 
types of formal errors have in the duration of a case. Figure 7 presents the 
duration of cases for rejections based on each article of Acordada. The longest 
lasting cases are those rejected under article 6 (345 days), article 4 (340 days) or 
article 1 (336 days). Article 6 cases last close to a month longer than the average 
case. The cases which last the least are those rejected under articles 3 and 2
34
 (92 
                                                     
34
 Article 3 cases refer to a hoist of criteria including specific references about the court 
whose decision is appealed, the facts of the case, the type of harm the decision generates for the 
appellant, a clear refutation of “each and every independent argument” on which the attacked 
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and 69 days faster than the average case, respectively). Article 7 cases are 
resolved on average 14 days faster than the average case.  
The results are somewhat puzzling as verifying compliance with more 
substantive requirements of Acordada –such as refutation of each independent 
argument made by the inferior court- takes less time than checking purely formal 
errors –such as verifying the number of lines per page-. In addition, the variation 
in duration among cases being rejected due to similar reasons –such as under 
articles 3 and 6- defies our initial intuitions. This is especially perplexing as 
article 6 asks the court to verify only a subset of the requirements needed under 
article 3, but the later rejections take on average 119 fewer days.  
 
FIGURE 7 
CASE DURATION ACCORDING TO ERROR TYPE 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
decision rests, and a “direct and clear relationship” between the federal norms invoked and the 
decision that has been reached. Article 2 refers to the requirements that the front page of the appeal 
must have. 
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Case duration is also affected by the number of articles cited while 
rejecting a case. Figure 8 reports case duration according to the number of articles 
cited by CSJN. Besides the three total cases which have 4 or 5 articles cited, cases 
are resolved the fastest when CSJN cites the violation of just one article (on 
average 7 days faster than the mean case). Cases where CSJN cites the violation 
of two or three articles take on average close to a month more (27 and 29 more 
days, respectively) to be resolved.  
 
FIGURE 8 
CASE DURATION DEPENDING ON THE NUMBER OF ARTICLES CITED AS 
VIOLATION* 
 
 
2. Case characteristics: type of claim, jurisdictional origin and appellant 
status  
In addition to the type of errors, case characteristics may affect case duration. One 
such characteristic is the type of claim raised for appeal. Figure 9 presents case 
duration when appeals claimed the lower court decision was arbitrary. Federal 
affront cases, those where arbitrariness was not claimed, have an average duration 
of 305 days (13 days shorter than the overall mean case) while arbitrary decision 
cases take on average 325 days to be resolved (just 7 days over the mean).  
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FIGURE 9 
CASE DURATION AND CLAIM TYPE 
 
Several interviewees mentioned the importance of article 11’s exception 
to prevent unjust outcomes.
35
 Whenever the appellants are individuals, we 
expected CSJN to respond by spending more time trying to establish whether the 
application of article 11 is necessary as a way to prevent structural differences 
among litigants from affecting case outcome. When only individuals appeal, case 
duration is slightly longer than average (6 days longer than the mean). The small 
difference in case duration observed suggests that CSJN pays little or no special 
attention to that subset of cases.
36
  
The previous conclusion remains even after modifying appellant 
specification and considering cases with and without individuals as appellants. 
The average duration of cases with individual appellants drops to an average of 
314 days while the average duration of cases without individual appellants 
increases to 339 days. Furthermore, when the state is the appellant CSJN averages 
353 days (35 days above the mean) to reject a case.  
3. CSJN’s internal organization 
CSJN’s internal division of “thematic” JDs may affect case duration. For one, 
each JD has significant procedural discretion in terms of handling cases internally 
and organizing its work, before they are distributed to the Justices. Furthermore, 
each one deals with specific areas of the law which has significant impact on the 
                                                     
35
 Interview A-3; A-6; A-13; A-14. 
36
 In unreported results we also tested case duration depending on appellant gender. We 
found no difference in mean duration. 
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number of cases they receive. In addition to being the area with the highest 
number of Acordada opinions, Labor Law cases take the longest to be resolved 
with an average duration of 418 days (100 days slower than the mean). At the 
other end of the spectrum, Tax Law cases are rejected in only 137 days on 
average (a staggering 183 days faster than the mean case).  
 
FIGURE 10 
DURATION BY CASE SUBJECT AREA 
 
In order to explore the differences in case duration given each underlying 
subject matter, we looked at the different workloads of each JD. As mentioned in 
section II, each case is assigned to a specialized JD for preliminary drafting. 
Based on our subject matter coding, we assigned cases to the specialized JD we 
expected to handle them. Table A-1 in the Annex shows these results. 
Table 2 reports the data on the amount of cases decided with the 
involvement of each JD in 2012, excluding Pension Law cases.
37
 In addition, it 
reports the number of cases decided according to Acordada with the involvement 
                                                     
37
 This exclusion doesn’t affect our findings as Pension Law cases are dealt with by JD N° 
2. 
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of each JD and the total number of law clerks working in each JD.
38
 Based on the 
information provided by CSJN’s website, JD N° 6 –in charge of Labor Law 
appeals- has a total of 9 law clerks, a figure that is just above the mean. The 
average number of cases each law clerk had to handle in JD N° 6 (relative to the 
total number of Labor Law opinions issued in 2012) was 142 for 2012.
39
 This is 
21 cases (13 percent) less on average than the mean amount per specialized JD 
and 62 cases less (38 percent) on average than the amount each JD N° 3 clerk had 
to handle (this is especially noticeable given that Acordada criminal cases are on 
average 120 days shorter than Labor Law ones). These results are robust to 
changes in our comparison frame.
 40
  
 
TABLE 2 
WORKLOAD BY JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 
Judicial 
Department 
# of cases 
decided by 
Acordada 
# of 
Opinions 
issued in '12 
Total # of clerks by 
Judicial 
Department 
# of opinions issued in 
2012 per clerk 
JD N° 1 57 955 5 191 
JD N° 2 121 1,026 12 86 
JD N° 3 116 1,857 9 206 
JD N° 4 180 1,865 10 187 
JD N°5 5 330 2 165 
JD N° 6 434 1,280 9 142 
JD N° 7 92 1,499 9 167 
 
It is worth noting that CSJN expressed at the beginning of 2012 concern 
about case congestion on the 2 areas of law which we found to have the longest 
lasting case duration.
41
 Indeed, in February of 2012 CSJN enacted Acordada 1 
which mandated a redistribution of tasks among specialized JDs.
42
 As a result of 
Acordada 1, Human Rights Law cases were moved from JD N° 6 (otherwise 
dealing with Labor Law) to JD N° 5. It is possible then that the extended duration 
that we observe both in Labor Law and Human Rights Law cases is due to a 
backlog of previously accumulated appeals. Nevertheless, Muro et al. (2016) 
                                                     
38
 This information is based on information available from CSJN website. 
39
 Here we assume that each law clerk handles independently a certain number of cases. 
This may not be the case.  
40
 For instance, if we were to compare the average number of cases worked by each law 
clerk in JD N° 6 relative to the stock of Labor Law cases at the end of 2011 plus the total number 
of newly filed Labor Law cases in 2012, we see similar results. The average for all specialized JDs 
is 348 cases while the number for JD N° 6 is 319. 
41
 Interview A-3. 
42
 Acordada 1/12, available online at http://www.csjn.gov.ar/docus/documentos/verdoc.jsp 
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report that the backlog of cases of JD N° 6 at the end of 2011 was smaller than 
that of JDs N° 3 and N° 4, suggesting that other causes were at play.  
4. Justices level of agreement 
We expected cases with dissenting or separate opinions to take longer to be 
resolved because Justices would need to spend more time on the case. Both type 
of cases take longer to be resolved than the average case. Nonetheless, the 
difference from the mean is quite small, with separate opinions averaging 327 
days for cases and dissenting opinions averaging 334 days.  
 
FIGURE 11 
CASE DURATION BY LEVEL OF AGREEMENT  
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The total number of opinions with some degree of dissent is interesting in 
itself. The objective nature of Acordada rules would suggest little, if any, room 
for disagreement. Nonetheless, 5 years after the implementation of Acordada, 10 
percent of the opinions issued under its guise merited differences in opinion 
among the Justices.
43
 Even though not every dissent or separate opinion was 
based in different interpretations of Acordada -for instance, some dissenting 
opinions asked for the opinion of the Procurador General de la Nacion-, its full 
implementation seems to continue to be a work in progress. Interestingly, more 
than half of the cases with dissenting or separate opinions are criminal cases, 
representing 39 percent of all the criminal dismissals on Acordada grounds. The 
later figure greatly exceeds the 15 percent figure we observed in the whole 
population. Disagreement seems the largest when criminal cases arise. 
5. Survival Analysis 
The duration of cases can be summarized through parametric and non-parametric 
survival analysis, which frames the time to occurrence of an event, in order to 
identify what case characteristics make it more or less likely that a case is decided 
sooner or later. Let us define T as the random variable that represents this non-
negative time span in days, where      represents the probability density of T, 
            the cumulative distribution up to day t and             
depicts the survival function - the probability of a case remaining undecided at 
time t. Also, let      
    
    
 be the hazard function that describes the instantaneous 
rate at which a case is decided at any point in time, or the rate at which the risk of 
a case remaining undecided accumulates through time.
44
  
Based on these definitions, we computed Kaplan-Meier survival 
estimates for the 1,134 cases for which date data could be recovered from the case 
file.
45
 This estimator multiplies the successive probabilities of a case being 
decided at a certain point of time with any previous probability computed, over 
small time intervals, to get      
    
  
    , where    is the number of cases 
undecided at the beginning of the analysis (i.e. all cases) and d the number of 
cases decided at each point in time. With these estimates, Figure 12 depicts the 
survival probability for criminal and civil cases. The probability of criminal cases 
being decided is higher than civil cases up to a point close to 280 days, where 
both equal 55 percent, and afterwards the trend reverts: criminal cases become 
relatively more likely to be resolved by the Supreme Court. Also, criminal cases 
                                                     
43
 It should be noted that the bulk of separate and dissenting opinions come from three 
Justices: Zaffaroni (45%), Maqueda (28%) and Highton (19%). 
44
 Cleves (2010). 
45
 This accounts for 99% of the population of cases retrieved 
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are highly unlikely to remain within the Supreme Court after a year, given that the 
probability of continuing unresolved drops below 10 percent after 432 days; 
conversely, civil cases only reach a 10 percent probability of continuing 
unresolved after 615 days, over 180 days relative to criminal cases.  
 
FIGURE 12 
DURATION OF CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CASES 
 
Case duration is also related to where the case originated from, be it a 
federal, provincial or national court. From our estimates, cases that reach the 
Supreme Court from a federal court have a lower probability of remaining on the 
roster: on average, the probability for a federal case to be resolved in time is 2 
percent higher at any point in time than a case originated in another court (Figure 
13). 
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FIGURE 13 
DURATION OF CASES COMING FROM FEDERAL OR OTHER COURTS 
 
Case duration also varies significantly among subject areas. Particularly, 
cases involving labor law have a low expectation of being promptly decided by 
the Supreme Court. While a non-labor cases has a probability of remaining 
undecided after six months of 60 percent, a labor case has a 95 percent probability 
of remaining on the roster by that time; after a year, the survival probability for 
non-labor civil cases and labor cases drops proportionally, around 40 percent, but 
labor remains at 55 percent by the end of the first year on the roster.  
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FIGURE 14 
LABOR VS NON-LABOR CASES 
 
To summarize these results, a parametric model was developed to 
synthesize some qualitative comparisons over case duration, particularly over 
Acordada articles, jurisdictional origin and subject matter. For this, we assume 
that T follows a lognormal distribution assumption, such that          
  , where W is the standard normal distribution. This assumption is grounded on 
the non-linear path of the survival functions, as shown for civil vs criminal cases, 
and statistical tests on the parameters of the more general Gamma distribution 
estimates.
46
  
From the results of the model, depicted in detail in Table 3 below, time to 
decision is mostly affected by the area of the law the case relates to, as well as 
some characteristics of the appellants. The statistical effects related to the 
particular articles from Acordada cited as errors diminishes when controlling for 
area of the law and the characteristics of appellants: only Article 1 is associated 
                                                     
46
 Following Cleves (2010) p. 277-279, we tested several hypothesis on the Gamma 
estimation to determine the best distribution assumption for the model. First, we tested the null 
hypothesis            to test for Weibull distribution and could reject it at a 99% confidence 
level (            ). Second, we tested the null joint hypothesis                  to 
test for the exponential distribution and rejected it at 99% confidence level (              . 
Finally we tested the null hypothesis            to test for lognormal distribution and could 
not reject the hypothesis             ; therefore, we estimated the model assuming time 
follows a lognormal distribution. 
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with a longer duration, as compared to when any other article is cited, by 28 days 
on average, and the effect remains significant at the 95 percent confidence level. 
Neither the source of the case, the type or gender of appellants or a REX seem to 
affect duration in a statistically significant way. Cases involving labor or public 
law are more likely than others to be decided at a later point by 92 and 36 days 
respectively, as compared to overall the median time, while tort law cases are 
more likely to be resolved sooner by 36 days. The dynamics of criminal with 
respect to civil cases, as suggested by Figure 12, involves a trend reversion after 
280 days: criminal cases last longer unresolved up to this point in time, given the 
higher survival probability vis-a-vis civil cases, but then the probability of 
survival decreases at a faster pace, making criminal cases much more likely to be 
decided in comparison to civil cases. Finally, these results are robust across 
distributional assumptions for the parametric specification, as detailed in Table 4. 
TABLE 3 
PARAMETRIC MODEL FOR CASE DURATIONS 
Dependent variable: Time to decision t Specification 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      Articled cited as formal errors (Base: Other article cited) 
    =1 if Art 1 cited 0.136* 0.163** 0.169** 0.126** 0.093**  
=1 if Art 2 cited -0.174 -0.19 -0.202 -0.137 -0.069 
=1 if Art 3 cited -0.329* -0.344* -0.335* -0.207 -0.038 
=1 if Art 4 cited 0.108* 0.086 0.089 0.032 -0.002 
=1 if Art 5 cited -0.23 -0.218 -0.24 -0.242 -0.139 
=1 if Art 6 cited 0.178* 0.163 0.158 0.035 0.077 
=1 if Art 7 cited -0.018 -0.033 -0.028 -0.009 -0.038 
      Source of case 
     
=1 if case came from federal court 
 
-0.191*** -0.168** 0.05 0.03 
=1 if case came from provincial court 
 
-0.008 -0.03 0.081 0.045 
      Appellant type and gender 
     
=1 if all appellants are individuals 
  
0.118* 0.116** 0.021 
=1 if all appellants are female 
  
-0.073 -0.055 0.03 
      Extraordinary Appeal  
     
=1 if Recurso Extraordinario Federal (REX) 
   
0.000 0.034 
      Civil subtypes areas dummies (Base: Civil =0) 
     
=1 if case subject is Labor Law 
   
0.666*** 0.309*** 
=1 if case subject is Public Law 
   
0.231*** 0.120**  
=1 if case subject is Tort Law 
   
-0.434*** -0.127*  
      Criminal (Base: Civil =0, Time < 280 days) 
     
=1 if case subject is Criminal Law or Criminal Procedure Law 
  
0.499*** 
=1 if time is equal or longer than 280 days 
    
1.023*** 
=1 if case subject is Criminal Law or Criminal Procedure Law  
and time is equal or longer than 280 days 
-0.466*** 
      Constant 5.487*** 5.543*** 5.478*** 5.149*** 4.795*** 
      Ln(σ) -0.411*** -0.418*** -0.421*** -0.552*** -1.023*** 
            
Observations  1,134   1,134   1,134   1,134   1,134  
Log-Likelihood -1,143 -1,136 -1,132 -983 -449 
Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) 2,304 2,293 2,290 1,999 939 
Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) 2,349 2,349 2,356 2,085 1,039 
  
Robust standard errors 
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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TABLE 4 
ROBUSTNESS FOR CASE DURATION MODEL 
Dependent variable: Time to decision t Assumed parametric distribution 
Independent variables: Exponential Weibull Lognormal Log-logistic Gompertz Gamma  
       Articled cited as formal errors (Base: Other article cited) 
     =1 if Art 1 cited -0.080* -0.161 0.093** 0.099** -0.119 0.092**  
=1 if Art 2 cited 0.06 0.131 -0.069 -0.077 0.2 -0.068 
=1 if Art 3 cited 0.047 0.186 -0.038 -0.018 0.118 -0.039 
=1 if Art 4 cited -0.009 -0.063 -0.002 0.007 -0.103 0 
=1 if Art 5 cited 0.1 0.187 -0.139 -0.117 0.188 -0.134 
=1 if Art 6 cited -0.087 -0.434 0.077 0.053 -0.36 0.078 
=1 if Art 7 cited 0.04 0.131 -0.038 -0.026 0.12 -0.038 
       Source of case 
      
=1 if case came from federal court -0.021 0.011 0.03 0.037 0.041 0.029 
=1 if case came from provincial court -0.044 -0.07 0.045 0.057* 0.047 0.045 
       Appellant type and gender 
      
=1 if all appellants are individuals -0.023 -0.102 0.021 0.018 -0.154* 0.022 
=1 if all appellants are female -0.028 -0.065 0.03 0.016 -0.026 0.03 
       Extraordinary Appeal  
      
=1 if Recurso Extraordinario Federal (REX) -0.038 -0.105 0.034 0.035 0.003 0.035 
       Civil subtypes areas dummies (Base: Civil =0) 
      
=1 if case subject is Labor Law -0.265*** -0.533*** 0.306*** 0.326*** -0.250* 0.301*** 
=1 if case subject is Public Law -0.096* -0.152 0.120** 0.133** 0.016 0.117**  
=1 if case subject is Tort Law 0.181** 0.723*** -0.128* -0.156** 0.301* -0.135*  
       Criminal (Base: Civil =0, Time < 280 days) 
      
=1 if case subject is Criminal Law or Criminal Procedure 
Law 
-0.437*** -0.942*** 0.499*** 0.513*** -0.523*** 0.492*** 
=1 if time is equal or longer than 280 days -1.012*** -2.995*** 1.023*** 0.957*** -2.242*** 1.021*** 
=1 if case subject is Criminal Law or Criminal Procedure 
Law 
 and time is equal or longer than 280 days 
0.468*** 1.383*** -0.466*** -0.459*** 1.144*** -0.466*** 
       Constant -4.895*** -14.709*** 4.795*** 4.808*** -5.334*** 4.808*** 
       Ln(p) for Weibull estimate 
 
1.067*** 
   
 
Ln(sigma) for Lognormal and Gamma estimates 
  
-1.023*** 
  
-1.023*** 
Ln(Gamma) for Log-logistic estimate 
   
-1.592*** 
 
  
Gamma for Gompertz estimates 
    
0.005***   
Kappa for Gamma estimate 
     
0.043 
              
Observations  1,134   1,134   1,134   1,134   1,134   1,134  
Log-Likelihood -1,207 -516 -449 -454 -800 -449 
Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) 2,451 1,071 939 948 1,640 940 
Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) 2,547 1,172 1,039 1,049 1,740 1,046 
  
Robust standard errors 
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
B. The effects of Acordada’s introduction on CSJN’s docket 
Once Acordada was introduced, new tasks were created within CSJN. At the 
same time, the number of cases was supposed to be handled much faster, given 
the relative simplicity of the tasks created. As a result, we expected an increase in 
the number of CSJN total decisions given that Acordada decisions would require 
less CSJN involvement. Figure 15 presents exploratory data on the number of 
cases decided by CSJN each month from January 2002 until December 2012. We 
do not observe an increase after the enactment of Acordada. The average number 
of cases decided each month in the year before its enactment was 1162. In the first 
year of Acodarda’s life, the average number of cases decided declined to 1103.  
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FIGURE 15 
CASES DECIDED PER MONTH IN THE PERIOD 2003-12 
 
 
VII. DISCUSSION 
A. Case duration 
Our main findings concern case duration. Chief among those results is the average 
case length. We expected Acordada decisions to be resolved in a speedy manner 
as procedural dismissals are believed to be an efficient way to dispose of a case.
47
 
One interviewee went as far as to suggest that those cases should last no more 
than 45 days.
48
 Nevertheless, it took CSJN on average just under 320 days to 
decide them. When we asked about this figure, most interviewees seemed 
astonished by its magnitude. The common explanation we received was that 
CSJN analyzes fully each and every appeal, regardless of formal errors, and that 
internal processes leading to decisions take time.
49
 Although we believe that 
                                                     
47
 Eisenberg and Huang (2012). 
48
 Interview A-3. 
49
 An interviewee with a more cynical view suggested that case duration reflects a 
bureaucratic need for self-justification. Interview A-5. Perhaps not surprisingly given the nature of 
Acordada 4 appeals, none of our interviewees mentioned strategic maneuvering as the reason for 
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there’s some validity to this claim, we still believe case duration to be excessive. 
In the only other jurisdiction that we know of where a Supreme Court dismisses 
appeals on formal grounds, i.e. Taiwan, the average dismissal time is 22 percent 
(70 days) faster.
50
 Further, as appeals are analyzed in a seriatim manner in each 
specialized JD
51
 the prolonged case duration likely delays the treatment of other –
perhaps more important- appeals. Similarly, the prolonged case duration could 
help explain the lack of CSJN increased output.   
CSJN’s internal organization proved to have the largest impact on case 
duration. The difference in mean case duration among areas of laws at each 
extreme of our census approached 300 days. We believe that case congestion in 
specialized JD N° 6 at the beginning of 2012 explains in large part the observed 
differences.
52
 Nevertheless, even after case redistribution at the beginning of 
2012, specialized JD N° 6 was involved during 2012 in 225 less total decisions 
than during 2011. In order to explain this fact, one interviewee mentioned that it is 
common for many Labor Law appeals to reach CSJN on similar grounds. In these 
cases, it is only after a leading case is decided that other cases will follow suit.
53
 
Hence, Labor Law case duration may also reflect this fact. While we are 
sympathetic to this argument, it seems a bit odd from a policy perspective that 
appeals failing to comply with Acordada would be delayed for this reason.
54
  
B. Acordada’s goals and effects 
The widespread view shared among our interviewees is that CSJN will never 
dismiss a case on formal grounds if the underlying injustice merits review or if 
CSJN “cares” about the underlying legal problem.55 To support this view, several 
                                                                                                                                                 
the lengthy average case duration. On strategic management of case duration by CSJN, see 
Kapiszewski (2006).    
50
 The average dismissal length is reported from Eisenberg & Huang (2012) and covers the 
period 1996-2008. Even if we believed that the average case duration numbers for Labor Law and 
Human Rights Law cases resulted of an spurious congestion and we omitted them, the average 
case duration in Argentina would still compare unfavorably to its Taiwanese counter-part by a 
total of 16 days. Pushing the comparison further, if we restricted the analysis to the last 5 years on 
which Eisenberg and Huang report data, the difference would be much larger. In those five years 
average case duration dropped to 206 days, 35 percent faster than in Argentina. 
51
 The seriatim way of managing appeals in each specialized JD was confirmed by several 
interviewees. 
52
 One interviewee suggested this was the reason for the increased duration in Labor Law 
cases. Interview A-3. 
53
 Interview A-13. 
54
 It is possible though that an appeal containing formal errors is purposely delayed if CSJN 
has yet to set the relevant precedent and CSJN wants to leave open the possibility of using 
Acordada’s exception to assure consistent results among similar cases. 
55
 For instance, Interview A-18. This view also confirms that our interviewees see CSJN’s 
function as incorporating both case based and issue based adjudication.  
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interviewees noted that a discovery of formal errors does not preclude further 
appeal analysis by CSJN. Nevertheless, the internal memo generated by the 
specialized JD is “more laconic” when formal errors are present.56 This structure 
suggests that cases containing egregious injustices would not be affected by 
Acordada but “hearable” cases would be. Furthermore, for appeals lacking 
relevant docket copies CSJN usually cannot complete its preliminary analysis due 
to insufficient information. These cases may also allow for more error in the case 
selection process. This is especially true since a Justice’s annual workload may 
allow just a few minutes to review any given petition.
57
 The results obtained in 
Criminal Law, an area where CSJN is relatively less likely to use Acordada, seem 
to confirm the effect. While 71 percent of all Acordada criminal cases are rejected 
for lack of relevant docket copies only 56 percent of all Acordada criminal cases 
containing dissent or separate opinions are rejected for lack of docket copies. 
Hence, Acordada has generated a new balance favoring access by litigants 
supported by specialized lawyers.
58
  
This finding is important because it incorporates docket management 
techniques into discussions of party success in developing countries. While 
several studies have confirmed the main tenets of party capability theory in the 
US,
59
 a few studies have found that Supreme Courts in other countries can 
actually favor weaker parties -either for strategic or ideological reasons-.
60
 
Nevertheless, those studies don’t focus on case dismissals.61 Kastellec and Lax 
have shown that not accounting for case dismissals can distort findings about the 
effects of case characteristics on outcomes.
62
 Our results suggest that docket 
management techniques may also affect case outcome results of previous studies, 
as well as the ability of even the most willing ideological courts to offset resource 
differences among litigants.  
                                                     
56
 Interview A-3; A-6. One interviewee illustrated this point by saying that Acordada is the 
certiorari of certiorari. Interview A-3. 
57
 Interview A-13. For instance, if the appeal doesn’t bring a copy of the lower court 
opinion or a copy of the REX practical reasons lead CSJN officials to work only with the available 
scant and unverifiable information. 
58
 Such a balance is consistent with findings elsewhere. For the United States Supreme 
Court, see Lazarus (2009) (where he shows that while the number of cases heard by the United 
States Supreme Court has declined by half since 1980, expert advocates participation in petitions 
granted plenary review has increased by an order of magnitude in the same period –from 5.8% in 
1980 to 55.5% in 2008). 
59
 Wheeler et al (1987); Songer and  and Sheehan (1992) 
60
 Haynie (1994); Dotan (1999). 
61
 For an exception focusing in the Taiwanese Supreme Court, see Chen, Huang and 
Lin (2014). 
62
 Kastellec and Lax (2008). 
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The new access to justice balance leads to question what CSJN was 
trying to achieve with Acordada, especially since it was enacted without prior 
consultation with Bar associations or lower courts.
63
 A first common answer we 
received was that CSJN had been receiving poorly constructed appeals, many of 
them unnecessarily long and largely abusing the copy-paste function.
64
 Hence, 
Acordada looked to reign in a situation where appeals were disrupting CSJN daily 
operations. Even though we believe that there is some truth to this explanation, it 
fails to explain why CSJN imposed a stern sanction to informal appeals.
65
 As a 
matter of fact, CSJN work could also have been facilitated if appellants were 
given a short period of time to amend their mistakes, as it is, for instance, 
provided by Section 14.5 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United 
States.
66
  
A second type of response we received involved CSJN docket 
management.
67
 In the years leading to Acordada, CSJN had been flooded with 
appeals.
68
 Two were the main drivers behind the large number of appeals. First, 
the economic crisis of 2001 led to tens of thousands of appeals claiming 
confiscation of individuals’ bank deposits.69 Second, CSJN’s new composition 
shifted its approach in many social rights issues towards a more progressive 
view.
70
 As a result, lots of cases reached the court. By late 2006, these led CSJN 
justices to believe that the size of their docket was limiting their ability to 
accomplish their tasks as the ultimate guardians of the Constitution.  
CSJN took several measures to bring down its docket size to more 
manageable levels. First, in December of 2006 -8 months ahead of Acordada’s 
enactment- CSJN decided in Massa to uphold the conversion of dollar deposits 
                                                     
63
 Interview A-5. The absence of prior consultation is in stark contrast to several reforms 
CSJN undertook after the 2001-2 crisis, suggested by a coalition of NGOs. Upon this exchange, 
CSJN adopted the disclosure of the circulation of case files among the different justices (Acordada 
35/2003), the publication in full text of its relevant verdicts (Acordada 37/2003) and decided that 
any meeting between litigants and justices must take place in the presence of the counterpart 
(Acordada 7/2004). Ruibal (2009). 
64
 One interviewee mentioned the case of an appeal 800 pages long. Interview A-6. 
65
 Before the enactment of Acordada, CSJN clerks would ask appellants to remediate any 
failure to comply with the existing appeal requirements. Interview A-18.  
66
 The rule mandates the Supreme Court Clerk to return the petition with a letter indicating 
its deficiency. A corrected petition can then be filed within 60 days. This is especially relevant 
since a couple of interviewees mentioned that the US rules served as inspiration for Acordada. 
Interviews A-6; A-3. 
67
 For instance, Interview A-9. 
68
 During the 2002-06 period, CSJN received on average more than 25000 appeals.  
69
 One interviewee estimated the number of appeals in CSJN to have reached 250000. 
Interview A-3. 
70
 Interview A-15. For a similar claim, see Valentin Thury-Cornejo (2011).  
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into rescheduled pesos deposits at the official rate determined by decree 214/2002 
–the key issue concerning the large mass of cases arising from the 2001 crisis.71 In 
itself, this decision cleared the way to solve thousands of similar appeals that had 
been waiting in the Court.
72
 Second, CSJN enacted Acordada 2 in February of 
2007 increasing 5 fold the deposit amount required to file an appeal.
73
 This is 
important since currency depreciation after the crisis had lowered the deposit 
amount from the equivalent of u$s 1000 to around u$s300. Third, CSJN Justices 
were becoming increasingly worried that their progressive decisions had signaled 
to lawyers that CSJN would review almost any lower court decision. This was 
especially problematic since it was recognized that many criticisms surfaced when 
CSJN decided non-constitutional issues.
74
 Hence, CSJN decided to limit their 
review of appeals based on arbitrary decisions to clearly egregious ones. Finally, 
CSJN approved new requirements to file petitions with Acordada. These 
requirements provided CSJN a way to limit its docket through a mechanism 
deemed objective and technical.
75
 The docket management explanation suggests a 
more complex scenario and points toward a set of policies taken to address the 
congestion problem. Nonetheless, it falls short of explaining why CSJN needed 
Acordada in the first place, as it could have already dismissed those cases without 
it under Article 280.
76
  
We believe, by contrast, there are two additional reasons for the 
enactment of Acordada. First, CSJN seems to have wanted lawyers to take the 
appeal work –and therefore CSJN’s own work- more seriously. According to one 
of our interviewees, a Justice argued that appeals needed to pass a “minimum 
sufficiency test” in order to merit review.77 Otherwise no professional fees would 
be awarded. Second, there was an implied legitimacy goal achieved. Put 
differently, CSJN seems to be using Acordada strategically to establish a wedge 
between dismissals. On the one hand, whenever CSJN denies certiorari based on 
its discretionary powers, any injustice that remains falls on the CSJN itself for not 
                                                     
71
 Massa, Juan Augustín v. Poder Ejecutivo National – Decreto No. 1.570/01 / amparo, 
J.A. (2007-I-187). 
72
 In fact, it is in December of 2006 that we start to see a decline in the number of appeals 
filed to CSJN.  
73
 Acordada 2/2207, available online at 
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/125000-129999/125009/norma.htm. 
74
 Interview A-15. 
75
 In more colloquial terms, an anonymous interviewee referred to Acordada rules as 
“booby traps”. 
76
 Interview A-13. 
77
 Interview A-15. 
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reviewing the case.
78
 On the other hand, if a case is dismissed under Acordada, 
any injustice that remains falls on the intervening lawyers who do not follow 
clearly established rules. Considering CSJN’s recent history –i.e. the legitimacy 
crisis suffered during the 1990s
79
-, it seems plausible that the legitimacy goal 
played an important role.
80
 To the extent that this interpretation is correct, it helps 
explain CSJN acceptance of the high ratio of Acordada usage.
81
  
Understanding Acordada’s goals also helps to make sense of its observed 
effects. Consistent with the docket management explanation the total number of 
appeals filed with CSJN decreased after the enactment of Acordada, continuing a 
sharp decrease trend which started a year earlier.
82
 At the same time, the total 
number of decisions remained largely stable after the enactment of Acordada. 
This result is more puzzling as we expected that, as a result of Acordada, the 
CSJN would be able to issue a greater number of decisions. We explored three 
alternative explanations for this result. First, we asked our interviewees whether 
CSJN granted certiorari in a higher percentage of cases post-Acordada. Second, 
we inquired whether the quality of opinions had improved. Finally, we asked 
whether Acordada rejections take the same amount of time as other rejections. 
None of our interviewees believed that the amount of cases granted certiorari had 
increased post-Acordada
83
 nor that the quality of the opinions had improved. In 
addition, only a couple of interviewees believed that CSJN decreased case 
duration post-Acordada, while several others believed it remained the same.
84
 
                                                     
78
 This proposition was suggested also by Fontana (2011), who argued that it was an 
excessive use of its discretionary powers what led the Russian Constitutional Court to very low 
approval ratings in the early 1990’s.  
79
 Kapiszewski (2006). 
80
 On the issue of Supreme Court legitimacy and procedural fairness, see Baird  (2001) 
(finding that it is the belief among West Germans that procedures are supposed to be neutral and 
legalistic which leads to perceptions of Federal Constitutional Court legitimacy).    
81
 Interview A-3.  
82
 After a peak in number of appeals filed in 2005 –totaling a staggering 31234 excluding 
pension law cases-, the number of appeals filed steadily declines until 2009 where it stabilizes at 
around 9000 extraordinary appeals per year. It is likely that the decrease in the number of appeals 
filed started as a result of fewer cases remaining undecided concerning the forced conversion of 
bank US dollar deposits into Argentine pesos deposits.  
83
 This suggests that CSJN reversal rates have not been affected by the enactment of 
Acordada. 
84
 One interviewee even suggested that all the decisions that use a prescribed formula (such 
as under Article 280, Acordada or lack of autonomous reasoning) take the same amount of time to 
be decided. Interview A-13. 
  
 
2016] DISMISSING APPEALS ON FORMAL GROUNDS 35 
Overall, the duration results and the qualitative information we gathered suggest 
that CSJN has yet to take full advantage of Acordada’s possibilities.85  
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ANNEX: FIGURES AND TABLES 
TABLE A-1  
NUMBER OF DECISIONS BY SUBJECT AREA 
9,5 
 
Total amount of cases with 
each sub area 
Specialized Judicial 
Department 
Constitutional Law 5 4 
Property Law 56 7 
Family Law  15 2 
Bankruptcy Law  19 1 
Criminal Law  76 3 
Criminal Procedure  40 3 
International Law  0 N/C 
Human rights Law  5 5 
Contract Law  38 1 
Insurance Law  4 2 
Tax Law  36 7 
Tort Law  102 2 
Labour Law  434 6 
Public Law 175 4 
 
TABLE A-2 
 LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
Name Position 
Abritta, Cristian  Secretario - Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación 
Álvarez Tuñón, Eduardo  Fiscal General - Cámara Nacional del Trabajo 
Blanco, Hernán  Secretario - Sala IV, Cámara Federal de Casación Penal 
Canevari, Esteban  Secretario - Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación 
Erbín, Juan  Sub-Director Nacional de Asuntos Judiciales de Procuración del Tesoro 
de la Nación 
Ferro, Lautaro D.  Partner - Pérez Alati, Grondona, Benites, Arntsen & Martínez de Hoz (h) 
Garay, Alberto F.  Partner - Carrió & Garay Abogados 
García Vior, Andrea  Secretaria - Sala II, de la Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones del Trabajo 
Giménez, María Inés  Partner - Bulit Goñi & Tarsitano 
Hockl, María Cecilia  Secretaria Letrada - Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nacion 
Incera, Luis M.  Partner - Pérez Alati, Grondona, Benites, Arntsen & Martínez de Hoz (h) 
Kiper, Claudio  Juez – Sala H, Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil  
Mairal, Hector A.  Partner - Marval, O'Farrell & Mairal 
Marra, Macarena  Secretaria - Sala II de la Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo 
Contencioso Administrativo Federal 
Navarro, Marcelo  Secretario Letrado - Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación 
Tarsitano, Alberto  Partner - Bulit Goñi & Tarsitano 
Veramendi, Enrique V. Partner - Marval, O'Farrell & Mairal 

 This list does not include individuals who have requested to remain anonymous.
 
                                                     
 
